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PREFERENTIAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
 SUDHA SETTY* 
  
Introduction 
 
The term “judicial activism”1 has come under fire in the last two 
decades—primarily by politically conservative commentators who decry the 
methodological legitimacy of judges relying on policy preferences and 
contemporary societal norms, in addition to precedent and the history and 
text of the Constitution, to inform their opinions.2  Chief Justice Roberts 
emphasized this perspective in his 2005 confirmation hearings, when he 
described the limited role of a judge as one who should “call balls and strikes, 
and not pitch or bat.”3 
 
Nonetheless, the Court has decided several cases in recent years in 
which the politically conservative judges on the Court have been labeled as 
judicial activists;4 one of the most prominent of these is Shelby County v. 
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Intellectual Life and Professor of Law, Western New 
England University School of Law.   I thank Matthew H. Charity for his thoughtful suggestions 
on this Essay, and Anthony Farley for the invitation to participate in this symposium. 
1 Many commentators credit the first use of this term to a 1947 magazine article, see Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 202, 208, but the debate over 
the role of judges in making law is centuries old.  See  THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (opining that the judiciary played an important role in lawmaking to the extent 
necessary to safeguard individual rights); see generally Paul Carrese, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: 
MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2003) (questioning the political 
origins and scope of judicial lawmaking). 
2 See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origins and Current Meanings of ‘Judicial Activism,” 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1441, 1442 (2004) (highlighting commentary from Judge Frank Easterbrook lamenting that 
“everyone scorns judicial activism”); see also Bob Ward, In Snowmass, Justice Antonin Scalia says 
judges should not be policymakers, ASPEN TIMES, July 21, 2013, available at 
http://www.aspentimes.com/news/7382102-113/scalia-judges-society-court (noting that Justice 
Scalia used the “twin terrors of Nazi Germany and radical Islam to warn...about the dangers of 
judicial activism”). 
3 Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Senators to Question First Supreme Court Nominee in 11 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/13confirm.html. 
4 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Selective Judicial Activism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1423 (2012) (labeling a 
number of decisions by the Roberts Court as “unmistakably activist,” including McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment is applicable to the 
states), Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to bear arms), and Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–78 (2007) (holding that a race-conscious school 
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Holder.5  In this symposium essay, I juxtapose the Court’s activism in 
Shelby—justified by the majority as necessary in light of the fundamental 
rights at stake—with its rigid and overly formalistic6 refusal to allow the 
litigation of national security-related cases in which ample evidence of the 
government’s abuse of fundamental rights exists.7  Although the national 
security cases are characterized by the judicial refusal to engage, and Shelby, 
to the contrary, is an example of an overaggressive judiciary, both share a 
problematic end result: enabling the undermining of the rights of vulnerable 
populations.8  I conclude that the Court is engaging in “preferential judicial 
activism,” whereby justices decide whether to formalistically dismiss cases 
before they even get to the stage of “calling balls and strikes” or, instead, 
engage in judicial activism based on their policy preferences. 
  
1. Judicial Activism in Shelby 
 
The majority in Shelby characterized the Court’s review of the Voting 
Rights Act of 2006 (“VRA”) as necessary given the fundamental rights at 
stake and the unusually broad reach of the VRA in mandating federal 
jurisdiction over voting matters.9  The Court acknowledged the substantial 
placement program was unconstitutional)); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485 (2012) (describing the invalidation of part of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010) as “conservative judicial activism”); Bryan Adamson, Ricci v. DeStefano: 
Procedural Activism?, 24 NAT’L BLACK L.J. (2011) (framing the Supreme Court decision 
overturning local decision-making regarding firefighter hiring in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 
(2009) as procedural judicial activism).  
5 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
6 Judicial formalism can be conceived in numerous ways, but I have used it elsewhere and here to 
describe a judicial methodology that gives primacy to narrow rule-following rather than viewing 
the judicial role as acting when necessary to preserve individual rights.  See Sudha Setty, 
Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1629 (2012).  See 
also Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612–16 (1999) (describing 
one form of formalism as “a purposive rule-following”).  Other commentators have described the 
constraints of judicial formalism as “a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the 
possibility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes 
about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or 
visionary.”  Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 
(1983).  On the other hand, Justice Antonin Scalia has supported use of a formal approach to 
maximize stability and credibility in the Supreme Court’s decision making, opining that a 
“discretion-conferring approach is ill suited . . . to a legal system in which the supreme court can 
review only an insignificant proportion of the decided cases.”  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
7 See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225 (2009) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s national security cases should be analyzed and understood in 
the larger context of its public law jurisprudence). 
8 Cf. Stone, supra note 4, at 1429 (arguing that there is no principled basis to undergird the 
activism of the conservative justices on the Court). 
9 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2618 (acknowledging the historical need for the “extraordinary 
measures” employed under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but noting that “[t]here is no 
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evidence compiled by Congress in support of VRA renewal,10 the 
overwhelming congressional vote reauthorizing the VRA11 and the 
longstanding tradition of the Court engaging in constitutional avoidance 
wherever possible12 –all well-established grounds for deferring to Congress 
altogether.  Yet the majority opined that it had little choice but to apply a 
high degree of scrutiny to the VRA,13  minimizing the objections of the 
dissenting justices and claiming the necessity of review given Congress’s 
purported failure to address the constitutional questions previously raised by 
the Court.14 
 
The dissent in Shelby, on the other hand, focused on the obligation of the 
court to defer to Congress15 and the lack of “usual restraint” that the Court 
exhibited in taking the case and then gutting the power of the VRA16 to 
combat the ongoing and serious problems of voter discrimination that both 
opinions acknowledge.17  In framing its objections in this manner, the dissent 
essentially accuses the majority of preferential judicial activism—taking on 
Shelby for the purpose of promoting its own preferences.18  
 
2. Judicial Formalism in the National Security Context 
 
By contrast, the judiciary’s stance in national security-related cases in 
which plaintiffs allege violations of fundamental rights has been 
characterized by a rigid, formalistic refusal to allow plaintiffs access to 
denying...that the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting 
in the covered jurisdictions”). 
10 Id. at 2629 (acknowledging that Congress “compiled thousands of pages of evidence before 
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act”). 
11 Id. at 2621. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2622 (citing the need to follow up on the Court’s previous evaluation of the VRA in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)). 
14 Id. at 2631 (opining that “Congress could have updated the coverage formula...but did not do so.  
Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice”).  In couching the lack of change to the coverage 
formula under Section 5 of the VRA as a congressional failure, the Court fully ignored the political 
realities hamstringing a politically divided Congress.  See Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? 
Political Polarization, the Supreme Court and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013) (arguing 
that a politically polarized Congress cannot effectively provide a corrective check on Supreme 
Court decisions that overreach). 
15 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 2644. 
17 Id. at 2633. 
18 See Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of 
Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-
curiousdisappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race/ 
(highlighting the extraordinary and irregular steps that the majority goes through to justify its 
decision-making). 
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courts, usually based on the acceptance of government invocations of 
procedural barriers to litigation.  Although the judiciary has historically 
deferred to executive branch decision making with regard to foreign policy 
and national security matters,19 that deference has expanded significantly 
and concretized recently. Such judicial formalism has consistently led to the 
dismissal of cases alleging serious government abuse in the post-September 
11 context.  
 
Government invocations of procedural hurdles have led to dismissals 
in a number of contexts.  Detainees alleging mistreatment and abuse while in 
detention facilities within the United States have been largely unable to 
bring suit against government actors, based on the Supreme Court’s 
imposition of strict pleading standards20 that constitute an almost 
insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs without the benefit of non-public 
information.21 The Supreme Court also denied certiorari in numerous cases 
dealing with well-supported allegations of extraordinary rendition and 
torture,22 even where dissenting opinions from lower courts23 and detailed 
19 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796-98 (noting that although “proper deference 
must be accorded to the political branches,” (citing United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936)) but reasoning nonetheless that the grant of 
habeas corpus rights to detainees at Guantanamo “does not undermine the Executive’s powers as 
Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, 
when confirmed by the Judicial Branch”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting that “judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s 
ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to 
determine—through democratic means—how best to do so”). 
20 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that government officials were not liable for 
abuses committed by their subordinates absent evidence at the pleadings stage that they ordered 
the allegedly discriminatory activity). 
21 See Adam Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (arguing that the 
heightened pleading standard established in Iqbal creates severe obstacles for the litigation of 
legitimate allegations of abuse). 
22 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (upholding the dismissal of a suit alleging extraordinary rendition 
and torture based on the government invocation of the state secrets privilege); Arar v. Ashcroft, 
585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (dismissing suit seeking damages 
for extraordinary rendition and torture upon a finding that constitutional and international law 
obligations did not apply and that special factors counseled hesitation in the absence of 
congressional guidance); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 
296 (4th Cir. 2007), and cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007) (dismissing suit seeking damages for 
extraordinary rendition and torture upon upholding the government’s invocation of the state 
secrets privilege).  In many of these cases, a vocal dissent argued that the courts were succumbing 
to the policy preferences of the administration and not engaging in the type of rule of law analysis 
required given the allegations at issue.  
23 Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1095 n.5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former employees of the 
defendant understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted in the torture of 
detainees, but that the company continued to run the flights because they “paid very well”); Arar, 
585 F.3d at 615, 618 (Sack, J., dissenting) (noting that the allegations of Arar’s mistreatment and 
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investigations in other nations found credible evidence that the alleged 
abuses occurred and that the victims deserve compensation.24  Similarly, a 
case where the plaintiff sought accountability for the targeted killing by the 
U.S. government of a U.S. citizen living overseas was dismissed,25 despite 
public admissions by the Obama administration that the killing occurred as 
alleged.26  
 
These examples of judicial formalism that enabled the dismissal of 
cases at the pleading stage illustrate the judiciary’s internal struggle to 
determine its appropriate role when confronted with questions of 
constitutional rights during times of war or perceived emergency.27  This 
dilemma has confronted courts in constitutional democracies around the 
world,28 but many foreign courts, unlike those in the United States, have 
torture was credible and detailed in a report by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
the Inspector General). 
24 See Setty, Judicial Formalism, supra note 6, at 1640 (citing Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for 
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]-[47] (Eng.)); see El-Masri v. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 (E.Ct.H.R. Dec. 13. 2012) 
(awarding €60,000 to Khalid El-Masri based on Macedonia’s complicity with the CIA rendition 
and torture of El-Masri); Patrick Wintour, Guantánamo Bay detainees to be paid compensation by 
UK government, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-bay-compensation-claim (noting that 
Binyam Mohamed would be paid one million pounds from the British government in 
compensation for suffering extraordinary rendition and torture). 
 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report 
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Analysis and Recommendations (2006) (concluding after a 
detailed and lengthy inquiry that Arar had been subject to extraordinary rendition and torture as 
he alleged). 
25 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing suit seeking injunctive relief 
for the listing of plaintiff’s son on the U.S. targeted killings list based on standing and political 
question grounds). 
26 President Barack Obama, Remarks of President Barack Obama, (May 23, 2013) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama. 
27 In Minimalism at War, Cass Sunstein analyzes three categories of judicial decision-making in 
wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer broadly to executive branch claims 
of Article II authority without weighing the cost in terms of constitutional liberty interests; liberty 
maximalism, in which courts maintain a peacetime approach to the protection of constitutional 
liberty interests; and minimalism, in which courts use constitutional avoidance theory, statutory 
authority, and a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh security and liberty interests.  
See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50–52 (2004).  Sunstein views 
national security maximalism as inadequately accounting for fundamental liberty principles, 
liberty maximalism as unrealistic and unwarranted given the need for greater government 
intrusion into liberties during wartime, concluding that minimalism is the most appropriate 
judicial approach during wartime.  Id.  I suggest that Mohamed and similar decisions should be 
conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow adherence to procedures and rules as a 
means of enabling deference to executive secrecy claims and avoiding real engagement in the civil 
liberties dilemma underlying the case. 
28 See generally Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and the Fight 
Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 125–26 (2003) (discussing the obligation of the Israeli 
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allowed such cases to continue and plaintiffs to have their grievances heard 
in court.29  Yet in the United States, the ability of plaintiffs to seek 
government accountability in the courts has been conspicuously absent.30 
 
Conclusion 
 
The judiciary’s consistent unwillingness to allow those abused by 
counterterrorism policies to litigate their basic human and civil rights should 
be read alongside Shelby’s preferential judicial activism that set the stage for 
undermining protections of the right to vote for racial minorities.  Taking 
these two dynamics together, it becomes clear that multiple reforms need to 
be undertaken to protect individual rights.  First, Congress should attempt to 
surmount its political differences to offer legislation to protect individual 
rights.  In the national security-related cases referenced here, the Bush and 
Obama administrations successfully demanded dismissal; even as courts 
acquiesced, they exhorted Congress to offer guidance31 or a specific remedy 
for plaintiffs32 who offer compelling evidence that they suffered from abuse at 
the government’s hands.33    In the context of Shelby County, President 
Obama, Attorney General Holder and members of Congress have encouraged 
passage of legislation to strengthen access to the ballot box for racial 
judiciary to remain vigilant against incursions on the rule of law); Aileen Kavanagh, 
Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism and the Courts: Changes in the British Constitutional 
Landscape, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 172, 173–74 (2011) (discussing the extent to which U.K. courts 
have engaged in constitutionalism as part of their decision-making after the passage of the 
Human Rights Act of 1998); Mrinal Satish & Aparna Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist 
Judiciary: The Indian Supreme Court’s Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. 
INDIA REV. 51, 59–67 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its 
approach to terrorism-related cases and other cases involving fundamental rights). 
29 See generally Setty, supra note 6 (detailing plaintiffs’ access to court in United Kingdom and 
Israeli cases involving allegations of extraordinary rendition and torture). 
30 See generally id. 
31 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 564-65 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that only if “Congress chooses to 
legislate on this subject, then judicial review...would be available”); but see id., at 615 (Sack, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that additional congressional guidance was not required before allowing Arar 
to pursue his claims). 
32 To be specific, the majority in Mohamed, after finding that plaintiffs’ suit should be dismissed, 
suggested that that Congress could initiate an investigation into government abuses, enact 
private bills to compensate the plaintiffs, or take up state secrets reform. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d 
at 1091–92.  The majority further suggested that the executive branch may decide someday to 
compensate the victims of the extraordinary rendition program, as was done decades after the 
rendition and internment of individuals of Japanese descent during World War II.  See id. at 
1091.  It is noteworthy that the majority considered the reparations awarded to World War II 
internees as a potentially appropriate model of compensation for extraordinary rendition and 
torture, considering that the deferential formalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (holding that race-based exclusion orders were constitutional), is viewed by most modern 
commentators as a profound failure of the judiciary to apply a rule of law analysis to a case 
weighing security interests with human rights. 
33 See Setty, supra note 6, at 1638, 1644 (noting the evidence supporting the veracity of 
Mohamed’s allegations). 
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minorities.34  It is clear that Congress must assert its role to protect the civil 
rights of vulnerable populations.35  At the same time, courts must 
acknowledge the ongoing preferential judicial activism that has distorted the 
judiciary’s role and fueled critiques of the current Court as being 
problematically politicized;36 only through such acknowledgement and the 
rejection of those preferential norms can the judiciary reassert its 
institutional role as a bulwark to protect individual rights. 
 
34 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Supreme Court Ruling on 
Shelby County v. Holder, (June 25, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-ruling-shelby-county-v-holder; Attorney 
General Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder on Voting Rights Act Decision (June 25, 2013) 
available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/HolderonV; Press Release, Representative 
Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi: Supreme Court Takes a Step Backward on Voting Rights (June 25, 2013) 
available at http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-supreme-court-takes-a-step-
backward-on-voting-rights; Press Release, Representative John Lewis, Rep. John Lewis Calls 
Court Decision “a Dagger” in the Heart of Voting Access (June 25, 2013) available at 
http://johnlewis.house.gov/press-release/rep-john-lewis-calls-court-decision-%E2%80%9C-
dagger%E2%80%9D-heart-voting-access; Senator Patrick Leahy, “From Selma to Shelby County: 
Working Together to Restore  the Protections of the Voting Rights Act” (July 17, 2013) available 
at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-judiciary-committee-holds-hearing-on-the-voting-
rights-act. 
35 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 9, 58-59, 164 (2006) (arguing that Congress has acted in 
rights-protective ways as a matter of principle, such as the passage of post-Civil War legislation 
like the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
36 See, e.g., David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, 
THE ATLANTIC, June 29, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-
polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/. 
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